Cooperative Measures for International Cybersecurity (SWP 57) by Meyer, Paul
   
Cooperative Measures for International 
Cybersecurity   
Paul Meyer  
 
 
 
 
Simons Papers in Security and Development 
No. 57/2017 | March 2017 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 57/2017      2 
 
 
The Simons Papers in Security and Development are edited and published at the School for 
International Studies, Simon Fraser University. The papers serve to disseminate research work in 
progress by the School’s faculty and associated and visiting scholars. Our aim is to encourage the 
exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the series should not limit 
subsequent publication in any other venue. All papers can be downloaded free of charge from 
our website, www.sfu.ca/internationalstudies. 
 
The series is supported by the Simons Foundation. 
 
Series editor: Jeffrey T. Checkel 
Managing editor: Martha Snodgrass 
 
 
 
Meyer, Paul, Cooperative Measures for International Cybersecurity, Simons Papers in Security 
and Development, No. 57/2017, School for International Studies, Simon Fraser University, 
Vancouver, March 2017. 
 
ISSN  1922-5725  
 
 
Copyright for this working paper: Paul Meyer, pmeyer(at)sfu.ca. 
 
 
Note: The final, definitive version of this working paper has been published as Chapter 4 in 
Reintroducing Disarmament and Cooperative Security to the Toolbox of 21st Century Leaders, 
edited by Dan Plesch, Kevin Miletic and Tariq Rauf, January 2017. Stockholm: Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and School of Oriental and African Studies 
(SOAS), University of London. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Reintroducing-
Disarmament-and-Cooperative-Security.pdf. All rights reserved. The views expressed in this 
article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent SIPRI, CISD/SOAS or the organizations 
with which the author is affiliated. 
 
 
School for International Studies  
Simon Fraser University 
Suite 7200 - 515 West Hastings Street 
Vancouver, BC Canada V6B 5K3 
 
  
  Cooperative Measures for International Cybersecurity     3 
 
Cooperative Measures for International Cybersecurity 
Simons Papers in Security and Development 
No. 57/2017   |   March 2017 
 
 
Abstract: 
Via stealthy means a new and promising environment of tremendous importance for 
humanity’s welfare and prosperity is being compromised by damaging state action. The 
environment is cyberspace and its “militarization” by covert state operations is posing a 
threat to the continued safe and peaceful use of this crucial domain of information and 
communication. Diplomatic action to develop norms for responsible state behaviour in 
cyberspace have not kept pace with military developments. The wider stakeholder 
community will need to become engaged on behalf of cooperative security measures if 
the dogs of cyber war are not to devour the disciples of cyber peace. 
Note: The final, definitive version of this paper has been published as Chapter 4 in 
Reintroducing Disarmament and Cooperative Security to the Toolbox of 21st Century 
Leaders, edited by Dan Plesch, Kevin Miletic and Tariq Rauf, January 2017. Stockholm: 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and School of Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS), University of London. 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Reintroducing-Disarmament-and-Cooperative-
Security.pdf.   
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Cooperative Measures for International Cybersecurity 
 
Cooperative security today appears to be a tenet honoured more in the breach than the 
observance. This contrast is particularly striking in the new security environment of cyberspace. 
The special character of this space, a human creation that has grown exponentially in magnitude 
and utility for global society in the time span of a generation, might with sufficient political will 
have spared it from the forces of interstate conflict, but this has not been the case. The 
militarization of cyberspace is proceeding apace and those constituencies that might have 
prevented this trend and maintained a sanctuary status for this unique environment were too 
unaware or too unorganized to mount an effective defence. 
According to a 2013 study by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 47 
states with national cybersecurity policies assigned some role to their armed forces even though 
only six states had at that time published military cybersecurity strategies.1 The United States 
has, as it so often is in international security matters, been a pace setter with respect to the 
military use of cyberspace. It created a distinct Cyber Command in 2009 with an initial budget 
allocation in fiscal year (FY) 2010 of US$ 114 million. This funding level was quadrupled to 
US $466 million for FY 2016. A parallel augmentation of personnel levels has occurred of the 
command’s Cyber Mission Force. The number of cyber teams is currently 123, comprising 4990 
people en route to a goal of over 6100 by FY 2018.2 
Admiral Michael Rogers, the head of both US Cyber Command and the National Security 
Agency, has been explicit in Congressional testimony about the states that pose a cybersecurity 
threat to the United States—Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, in descending order of 
capability—and the need to generate a ‘complete spectrum of capabilities’, both offensive and 
defensive, to counter such threats. He has also advocated for the development of a ‘cyber 
                                                          
1 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, The Cyber Index: International Security Trends and 
Realities (UNIDIR: Geneva, 2013), <www.unidir.org>. 
2 Statement by Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander, United States Cyber Command, before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 Apr. 2016, <www.armed-services.senate.gov>, p. 6. 
 Simons Papers in Security and Development No. 57/2017      6 
 
deterrence policy’ for the USA, the absence of which would amount to a ‘losing strategy’ for the 
nation.3 
While other states do not normally match the USA’s high standards of transparency in 
military matters, it would appear that many armed services are establishing cybersecurity entities 
and developing their cybersecurity capabilities. This is particularly significant when ‘offensive 
capabilities’ are included in the mix, or the capability to engage in cyber operations with an extra-
territorial disruptive, damaging or destructive effect. Admiral Rogers’ affirmation that the USA 
will seek the same military supremacy in the cyber realm as it does in other operational domains 
will no doubt spur potential adversaries to try to counter this and in so doing contribute to a nascent 
cyber arms race. 
Arguably, the first weaponization of cyberspace occurred some time in 2009–10 with the 
revelation that the so-called Stuxnet computer virus had been detected. This virus was a 
sophisticated cyber payload that targeted the computer-based control systems for the centrifuges 
used to enrich uranium at a nuclear facility in Iran. Stuxnet essentially caused the centrifuges to 
self-destruct, resulting in significant setbacks for the Iranian nuclear programme. While there was 
never any formal acknowledgment of responsibility for the attack, media leaks have attributed it to 
the USA probably in partnership with Israel. Stuxnet represented the first use of what can be 
considered a cyber weapon: a payload that actually caused physical damage and destruction, or 
‘kinetic effects’ in military parlance. 
This move on the part of a leading state from cyber defence to cyber offence had major 
implications. In the words of General (ret) Michael Hayden, a former director of the National 
Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency: ‘Somebody has used an entirely new class 
of weapon to effect destruction. Somebody’s army has crossed the Rubicon, and we’ve got a legion 
on the other side of the river now, and it’s not going back’.4 Hayden’s view is clearly that cyber 
weapons and presumably cyber war are irreversible realities the world must accept. His interviewer 
however observes that Caesar’s action in crossing the Rubicon was in violation of Rome’s law, and 
                                                          
3 Statement by Admiral Michael S. Rogers (note 2), during oral testimony. 
4 Cited in Bamford, J., ‘What @Snowden told me about the NSA’s cyberweapons’, Foreign Policy, 29 
Sep. 2015. 
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implies that legal restraints will be needed to avoid the devastation that unbridled cyber war could 
bring in its wake. 
A further challenge to maintaining a peaceful cyberspace is the linkage to outer space, an 
environment that has similar importance for society’s well-being and is also vulnerable to 
deliberate acts of destruction. All space operations have a cyber dimension as the 
communications between the 1300 active satellites in orbit and their ground stations are conveyed 
via cyber systems. Such signals are vulnerable to jamming to deny functionality, or ‘spoofing’, 
which can allow attackers to take control of a satellite. There have been several reports of cyber 
attacks against operational satellites including alleged Chinese cyberattacks against US remote 
sensing and meteorological satellites, although the details are often cloaked in secrecy.5  
These steps in the ‘militarization’ of cyberspace have not gone completely unchallenged, 
although it is evident that action on the military side has far outstripped that in the diplomatic 
arena. The potential for preventive diplomacy in the context of international cybersecurity has not 
been sufficiently acknowledged or acted on. As a New York Times editorial notes: ‘Cyberwarfare 
has already done considerable damage and can lead to devastating consequences. The best way 
forward is to accelerate international efforts to negotiate limits on the cyberarms race, akin to the 
arms-control treaties of the Cold War’.6 
Such a clear prescription has not been taken up to date, however, by the leading cyber 
powers that could energize efforts to establish ‘rules of the road’ for international cybersecurity. 
Although the call to develop ‘norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace’ has been echoed 
many times since the Obama Administration first put this goal forward in its May 2011 
International Strategy for Cyberspace,7 diplomatic progress to realize such norms has been 
sluggish. This may in part be due to the fact that while the USA was the first to articulate the need 
to forge a global consensus around such norms, it was Russia and China that were the first to 
                                                          
5 Robinson, J., ‘Governance challenges at the intersection of space and cyber security’, Space Review, 15 
Feb. 2016. 
6 New York Times, ‘Arms Control for a Cyberage’, 26 Feb. 2015. 
7 White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a Networked 
World (May 2011), 
<www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf>. 
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formulate a set of norms and put it before the UN for consideration. The Sino-Russian draft 
‘International Code of Conduct for Information Security’ of September 2011 had an ambitious 
provision for states ‘not to use ICTs [information and communication technologies] including 
networks to carry out hostile activities or acts of aggression, pose threats to international peace 
and security or proliferate information weapons or related technologies’.8 
This formulation proved problematic from a number of perspectives, not least the inherent 
ambiguity of terms such as ‘hostile activities’ or ‘proliferate information weapons’. The Sino-
Russian sponsors held sustained consultations at the UN on their draft set of norms, but the focus 
was more on domestic controls than arms control and it was based on a concept of ‘information 
security’ that was not universally shared. In January 2015 China and Russia circulated a revised 
version of their proposal. It dropped the arms control provision in favour of a more modest 
exhortation that states should refrain from activities ‘which run counter to the task of maintaining 
international peace and security’.9 
While the Code of Conduct proposal remains on the table, the principal focus of attention 
at the UN in recent years has been on a process involving a series of reports from the UN Group of 
Governmental Experts (GGE). This mechanism has involved groups of 15 to 25 government-
nominated experts examining ‘Developments in the field of Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) in the context of international security’. These groups produced consensus 
reports in 2010, 2013 and 2015, the focus of which was increasingly on the development of norms 
for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace and the confidence-building measures that could 
accompany them. 
The 2013 report had already flagged the risk to international peace and security 
represented by the lack of agreed norms for state behaviour in cyberspace. The 2015 report set out 
a bleaker depiction of the cybersecurity environment, which highlighted ‘a dramatic increase in 
incidents involving the malicious use of ICTs by state and non-state actors’. It also recognized that ‘a 
                                                          
8 United Nations, General Assembly, International Code of Conduct for Information Security, A/66/359, 
14 Sep. 2011. 
9 United Nations, General Assembly, International Code of Conduct for Information Security, A/69/723, 
13 Jan. 2015. 
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number of states are developing ICT capabilities for military purposes’ and that ‘The use of ICTs 
in future conflicts between States is becoming more likely’. 
Against this darker threat assessment, the report emphasized the development of 
‘voluntary, non-binding norms for responsible State behaviour…that can reduce risks to 
international peace, security and stability’. Among the specific recommendations were that: 
1. ‘States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally wrongful acts 
using ICTs; 
2. States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs; 
3. States should not conduct or knowingly support ICT activity contrary to its obligations 
under international law that intentionally damages critical infrastructure or otherwise 
impairs the use and operation of critical infrastructure to provide services to the public; 
4. States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities and share associated 
information on available remedies to such vulnerabilities. 
5. States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm the information systems of 
the authorized emergency response teams of another State. A State should not use 
authorized emergency response teams to engage in malicious international activity.’10 
Although these measures are all voluntary and there is no multilateral capacity to monitor 
their implementation, it is evident that they reflect an effort to apply existing principles of 
international humanitarian law to state conduct in cyberspace. In particular, to preclude attacks 
against critical infrastructure vital for civilians and attacks by or against emergency response teams 
to computer emergencies or cyber incidents, there are moves to give such teams a ‘protective 
status’ akin to that accorded the Red Cross and other humanitarian agencies under the Geneva 
conventions. 
The concept of state responsibility for actions committed on their territory was reaffirmed 
in the GGE report, which also called for cooperation in responding ‘to requests from other states 
in investigating ICT-related crime or the use of ICTs for terrorist purposes or to mitigate 
malicious ICT activity emanating from their territory’. Given the challenge of attribution in 
cyberspace and the absence of any international system of monitoring, it could prove difficult to 
                                                          
10 UN General Assembly, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information 
and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/70/174, 22 July 2015. 
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assess compliance with these norms in the months to come. Some recommendations of the 2015 
GGE verge on the wishful thinking, such as the call to report on and share information regarding 
ICT vulnerabilities— the very thing that states exploit to carry out cyberattacks. Overall, however, 
the 2015 GGE made progress compared to its predecessors in specifying the nature of the 
confidence-building measures and norms for responsible state behaviour it wanted to see 
implemented. 
While some at the UN admit to a degree of GGE fatigue, Russia and associated states 
were able to rally support for yet another GGE to get under way in 2016, with a reporting deadline 
of 2017. Although it may prove difficult for this GGE to add value to the findings of its 
predecessors, in the absence of any other authorized multilateral negotiating process on norms for 
responsible state behaviour, the UN GGEs with their broadly representative nature and consensus-
based decision making will provide the international community with a credible vehicle for norm 
development. 
This assessment of cybersecurity diplomacy has focused on the UN, and a technology as 
universal as the Internet certainly demands norms of global application, but there has also been 
some movement on cybersecurity cooperation at the regional level. The OSCE agreed an initial set 
of cyber confidence-building measures in December 2013. These voluntary measures dealt 
largely with information exchange and their degree of implementation is difficult to judge, 
although the OSCE did provide some institutional follow-up by establishing an Informal Working 
Group that will meet not less than three times per year to review the initial set of measures and 
consider the development of a second set. This envisaged second set has recently seen the light of 
day and reflects a general recognition of the need to make progress on cybersecurity norms despite 
the deterioration in East–West relations in the wake of Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. 
Other regional organizations, such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the 
Organization of American States, the African Union and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 
have also begun to consider interstate confidence-building measures on cyber activity, but they 
seem to be progressing more slowly and focusing more on cooperation in relation to countering 
cybercrime rather than governing interstate cybersecurity operations. The limited progress on 
establishing bilateral (US–Russian and US–Chinese) confidence-building measures or 
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cybersecurity dialogues appears to be a function of their vulnerability to the vagaries of bilateral 
relationships. The US–Russian cybersecurity dialogue, for example, despite having generated an 
initial set of confidence-building measures, remains frozen. 
China broke off participation in an embryonic bilateral cyber working group in the wake of 
the US Justice Department issuing indictments against five serving officers of the People’s 
Liberation Army in May 2014 for allegedly undertaking cyber espionage activities against US 
corporate entities. Chinese–US cybersecurity relations took a turn for the better after President 
Xi’s state visit to Washington, DC, in September 2015 and the understandings reached then 
regarding limits to cyber-enabled economic espionage. A High-level Joint Dialogue on 
Cybercrime was established in the wake of the Xi–Obama meeting and met subsequently in 
December 2015 and June 2016. A related Senior Experts Group on international norms in 
cyberspace has also met. It is not clear how far these mechanisms have been able to address the 
military dimensions of cybersecurity or whether it will be possible to devise cooperative security 
measures to govern the cyber operations of the two powers. The fact that communication channels 
have been established is a positive sign and a necessary condition for embarking on more 
significant cooperation. The continued absence of a similar dialogue in the Russian–US context 
is disconcerting and may make it difficult to achieve broader cooperative security arrangements in 
cyberspace. 
Conclusions 
International cybersecurity policy is in an embryonic and hence fragile state. The vitally 
important realm of cyberspace has hitherto been essentially free of destructive state action. Stuxnet 
demonstrated that the weaponization of this unique environment is a real threat and that diplomatic 
efforts on cooperative security approaches have not kept pace with military capacity building. The 
recommendations on confidence-building measures from the UN GGEs require serious take-up by 
concerned states if they are to have any material impact on state conduct in cyberspace. Revitalized 
cybersecurity diplomacy is called for if cyberspace is ever to be preserved for peaceful purposes. 
That revitalization will first and foremost require leadership on the part of one or more cyber 
powers. The USA, as noted above, arguably has the most at stake in providing for a cyberspace 
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in which the threat of hostile action has been eliminated or mitigated. It will now be for a post-
Obama administration to pursue with more vigour the forward-looking directions set out in the 
2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace with its call for a global consensus to be forged on 
norms for responsible state action. This consensus might have to be built up incrementally through 
a set of arrangements worked out bilaterally between the leading cyber powers rather than 
through a comprehensive process at the universal level. Recent progress on the bilateral 
cybersecurity track between the USA and China augurs well in this regard. 
Devoting the necessary political and diplomatic energy to making progress in regional 
security organizations is still highly desirable if common standards of state conduct in cyberspace 
are ever to be codified. An unheralded example of steady progress in hammering out such 
standards was the March 2016 decision by the OSCE to add a further five confidence-building 
measures to the initial set agreed on in 2013.11 The new measures include facilitating exchanges 
on securing critical cyber-enabled infrastructure. This in turn could yield agreement on 
cooperative measures such as prohibitions on disrupting cyber communication links with satellites 
or other vulnerable critical infrastructure assets. The existence of an ongoing OSCE discussion 
on cyber confidence-building measures has also allowed for engagement with Russia and the USA at 
a time when bilateral channels of cooperation have largely been shut down. A combination of self-
restraint and self-interest on the part of the cyber powers may keep cyberspace from being 
transformed into simply another ‘domain’ of military conflict. The international community, 
including its billions of ‘netizens’, would no doubt prefer a more solid and transparent basis for 
sustaining a peaceful cyberspace. It will require continued advocacy and activism to ensure that 
states really behave in cyberspace in the responsible manner they publicly espouse. 
 
                                                          
11 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Confidence-building measures to 
reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies, 
Decision no. 1202, PC.DEC/1202, 10 Mar. 2016. 
